Well, it's over. The curtain has come down on America's longest conflict.
There will be no fanfare or unfurling of "mission accomplished" banners. It didn't even end with a bang, but rather a whimper. It seems there are few in this country who know or even care about what's happening in Afghanistan, which is unfortunate. But for those that are interested, I'll give you my abridged take on the events that are happening and have happened over the last 20 years.
The Taliban ruled Afghanistan after winning a bloody civil war following the Soviet retreat in the late 80s. A strict version of Islamic Sharia law was instituted which severely restricted civil rights. In particular, rights for women were practically nonexistent. The Taliban are brutal, fundamentalist, religious extremists. In response to the events of 9/11 (events which were actually publicly denounced by the Taliban), the United States and a coalition of allies ordered the Taliban to turn over Osama Bin Laden, who was hiding in the country. The Taliban refused, and coalition forces invaded. The objective was to capture Bin Laden, overthrow the Taliban, and deny Al-Qaeda and other terrorists a territory from which to conduct their operations.
The initial invasion easily overwhelmed the Taliban and forced them to flee into neighboring Pakistan. But the coalition governments had no plan for what came after, and spent the next 2 decades trying to nation-build and stabilize an extremely unstable area. The U.S. alone spent about $978 billion dollars on the conflict, about $90 billion of which was spent training and equipping the new Afghan National Security Forces.
But how do you build a nation from scratch, in one of the poorest, least educated, socially fractured, geographically challenging places on Earth? There's no easy answer. You can't just throw money at the problem, as we've demonstrated. You can't prop up a foreign nation by strength of arms either, as we've also demonstrated. The people need to govern themselves and figure out their own path organically for any real progress to be made.
The Afghans are a disparate people with no national identity nor loyalty to a national government. Nor should they. The country's borders were drawn by the British back in the 1800s, and they did not account for tribal or ethnic group territories. The Durand Line that separates Afghanistan from Pakistan was drawn straight through the Pashtun peoples' land, and has historically not been recognized by most Afghans. Afghans are loyal to their tribes, their ethnic groups, or even to religious leaders. They have no interest in a corrupt national government that does nothing for them. Afghanistan is mostly mountainous and extremely rural. There is little in the way of infrastructure, communications, trade or cultural exchange between tribes which prevents the fostering of any national identity. Between that, the extreme poverty, and weak law enforcement, corruption is rampant.
But you may be wondering how, with over 300,000 U.S.-trained and equipped ANSF personnel, did the country fall so quickly and without much of a fight? That's a complicated question with an even more complicated answer. But I'll try to put it succinctly:
1. The actual number of troops was probably far fewer than that 300,000. "Ghost soldiers" plagued rosters everywhere, with corrupt commanders pocketing the paychecks of these nonexistent soldiers. Some lower ranking officers complained that their units were barely at half strength because of these administrative errors. By contrast, estimates of the Taliban's strength range from 50,000 to 150,000 fighters (not counting allied groups) and an extensive support network behind them.
2. The ANSF was built in our image. A large, modern, multi-faceted fighting force designed to secure the whole country. But Afghanistan is not the U.S. They don't have the economy, infrastructure or logistics to support a force that size. Culturally, it is one of the most uneducated and illiterate populations. How do you train these people to fly and maintain aircraft? The Afghan Air Force struggled to recruit competent personnel, and struggled to keep their aircraft flying. Trained pilots were targeted for assassination by the Taliban. As the U.S. tightened the purse strings, tools and parts were hard to come by. They were still relying on foreign contractors to repair and maintain the fleet.
But why was the Air Force so important, despite it being such a tiny part of the military? Because of the geography and lack of infrastructure. The ANA needed a way to get it's commandos (the troops actually willing and able to fight) to wherever the fight was, and to provide them with air support. Airlift capabilities are as vital in Afghanistan as they were in Vietnam.
3. Money. No war has ever been won without substantial financial backing. The Afghan government has no money, while the Taliban enjoys the support of major foreign benefactors (mostly in Pakistan) and profits from the manufacture and trafficking of opium.
4. Lack of support from neighboring nations. The U.S. has given billions of dollars to Pakistan to help stem the flow of fighters entering Afghanistan from Pakistan, but they took the money and ran. The Taliban primarily operates out of the rural, mountainous, Pashtun lands of northwest Pakistan, and the Pakistani government has done little to interfere with them. The international intelligence community has long suspected Pakistan's government and military of supporting the Taliban's insurgency.
5. The Taliban has been planning their resurgence for years. This isn't some spur of the moment dash for control. They've planted spies in Kabul, paid off military commanders and politicians, conducted assassinations and sabotage, built networks through the rural countryside, and conducted heavy recruiting operations. All they had to do was wait out the U.S. There's a saying that goes "the Americans have the watches, but the Taliban has the time." They knew they were safe in Pakistan and could simply wait us out.
6. Morale and motivation. The Taliban is a focused, fanatical group with clear objectives. The Afghan government and military is a loose collection of different peoples, all with their own agendas. Most of the ANA were poor kids from rural communities. They were just trying to make a buck. They had no interest in fighting and dying for the government. The commandos were at least capable fighters, going toe to toe with the Taliban, but there just weren't enough of them (between 10,000 and 30,000) to make a difference. They were run ragged, being ferried back and forth across the country, trying to stamp out insurgent attacks.
The Taliban strategy was to surround and isolate increasingly large pockets of government forces. They spent years building networks through the rural areas of the country, and earlier this year started attacking small outposts. ANSF forces fought valiantly at first, but it was always a losing proposition. There were no resupplies, no reinforcements, very little air support. Knowing that the government was largely incapable of resupplying these outposts (Taliban controlled the roads and the Air Force could only do so much), the Taliban would offer an ultimatum to the defenders who had run out of food and ammunition: surrender and either join us or go home to your family. And of course, the troops surrendered. What were they supposed to do?
As the Taliban captured more and more outposts, they started taking small towns and larger military bases. Each victory earned them looted weapons, vehicles, supplies, as well as new recruits. Their territory spread and they consolidated control over the countryside. But most importantly, they gained momentum and morale. They redoubled their recruitment efforts, citing their victories over the West and the puppet government in Kabul.
The country was already doomed before the summer, before the main Taliban offensive even started. They spent years meticulously placing the dominoes. All they had to do was topple the first one.
They captured their first provincial capital on August 6th. By the 15th, Kabul had fallen.
Thus ends a bloody, futile, heartbreaking, confusing chapter in American history. We did so much to help the people of Afghanistan. We thought that if we could win hearts and minds, the people would stand up for themselves. We built roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, power plants, airports, police stations, army bases and a brand new government from scratch. Women started to experience new rights and opportunities. The standard of living and life expectancy rose dramatically. But in the end, this was a country and a people that we did not understand. And we were fighting an enemy we did not understand.
Afghanistan has been called the "graveyard of empires" because of its imposing terrain and warrior culture. They beat the British twice, forced out the Soviets, endured numerous civil wars, and defied the Americans. They have been at war for the past 300 years, and much of their history before that as well. Genghis Khan swept through the area, as did Alexander the Great. Its position on the Silk Road solidified the region's strategic importance.
It was an endeavor we never should have tried. We became stuck between a rock and a hard place. We couldn't abandon the country that we just invaded, but we couldn't pursue the Taliban in Pakistan and elsewhere. We couldn't stay there forever, so when was the right time to leave? There probably wasn't a right time and there never would be. So sure, it's easy to say we never should have been there in the first place, but the U.S. also felt that it had to respond to the attacks of 9/11. Were we supposed to sit on our hands after our country experienced the worst attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor? There are no easy answers.
I hope our nation can learn from this defeat. The latest in a long line of foreign policy failures. And I hope this doesn't become another forgotten war. Too many good men and women were damaged or lost in this stupid conflict. The parallels to the Vietnam War are endless, but I won't get into that here. It just seems like we're not learning from our mistakes.
It's a beautiful, but troubled country. If you've never seen the Hindu Kush mountains and abutting mountain ranges, they are breathtaking. Perhaps some day the people there can get a reprieve from the violence and hardship.
Maybe this is just a rambling monologue of a bitter ex-soldier. Maybe it's just cathartic to put my thoughts out there. Maybe I'm just emotional about the sacrifices that were for naught. I'll always remember the work we put in over there. This isn't intended to spark political arguments, I just wanted to reflect on the end of an era.
This goes out to all my brothers and sisters in arms. The world may forget, but we won't.
OEF X-XI, Paktika Province, Afghanistan
Mark Kresge Jr Aaron Skeens Matthew Click Lance Brouwer Kyle Giddens Brandon Alan Lewis Chris Boyer Joseph Fink Corey Powers Abraham Anthony Reyes Manny Rivera Nick Baker Daniel Roberts Cody Quick Jesse Northrop Michael Hampton Tyler Gunter Joseph Carnet Jesse Kesler Dimitri Ivanov Daniel Mayen Adam Burden and all the others we served with. I salute you. Take care, gentlemen.
No comments:
Post a Comment