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Thursday, February 3, 2022

RSN: FOCUS: Masha Gessen | A Moment of Excruciating Anticipation in Kyiv

 


 

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03 February 22

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Members of the National Guard of Ukraine are training civilians in introductory-level military tactics and first aid. (photo: Christopher Occhicone/Getty)
FOCUS: Masha Gessen | A Moment of Excruciating Anticipation in Kyiv
Masha Gessen, The New Yorker
Gessen writes: "Russian sabre-rattling has been ramping up steadily since this summer. People in Kyiv started getting ready for war several weeks ago."

As the possibility of further war with Russia looms, people in Ukraine’s capital make plans to fight or flee.

Everyone in Kyiv has a plan. D., a nonprofit administrator, will drive six hours to meet her mother and teen-age brother at a spot near their house, and together they will cross over the Dniester River into Moldova. D. is also trying to apply for a carry license. She has a colleague who has dusted off his BB gun.

N., a video producer, her girlfriend, S., and the other adult members of their household—N.’s father and S.’s mother—had a family meeting to discuss their preparations. They rejected the idea of arming themselves, but not before researching options for quickly learning to shoot a gun. (“Who are we kidding?” N. ultimately concluded.) They dismissed the idea of heading west, because they have cats and dogs and they feared that their house would get robbed if they left it unattended. They considered getting an alarm system, but concluded that it would be useless if the police force stopped functioning. They discussed getting two large guard dogs, but they really don’t want that. Finally, they arranged to send N. and S.’s ten-year-old son to stay with friends in Western Europe if the need arose. Then N. set about stocking up. “We will only buy stuff we’re actually going to use this time,” she declared, mindful of the supplies of grain that they stockpiled in 2014, when Russia occupied Crimea, and kept until the grains became infested with pantry moths. Her first priority is to amass reserves of fuel for the car, for the generator, and for heating the house. People have been exchanging recommendations on social media: plastic cannisters are acceptable for diesel, they write, but make sure to use metal ones for gasoline. N. has figured out that fancy-looking flat gas cannisters designed for motorboats are harder to lift and use than the old-fashioned vertical ones. Fortunately, N.’s father is old enough to remember Soviet-era gasoline shortages and the art of using a hose and a small enema bulb to get the flow going. Finally, N. bought five bottles of vodka—the universal currency of wartime—and piled them into the freezer.

Russian sabre-rattling has been ramping up steadily since this summer. People in Kyiv started getting ready for war several weeks ago. Just before the New Year, a deputy mayor, Andriy Krishchenko, said that residents should pack a “go bag” in case of a Russian attack on the Ukrainian capital. In January, a few Western embassies—those of the U.S., Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom—evacuated some nonessential personnel and diplomats’ families. The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, has appealed to the people of his country to stay calm, and to Western politicians and media to stop spreading panic. On social media, residents of Kyiv have been trading advice on preparing for the next war: withdraw cash and convert it to dollars; make copies of key documents and laminate them to protect them from the elements.

All that supposed know-how angered Lena Samoilenko, a thirty-six-year-old cultural activist in Kyiv. Samoilenko grew up in Antratsyt, which is now part of the Russian-occupied east. On January 22nd, she wrote a Facebook post debunking the very idea that one can prepare for war. “When my town was occupied, the banks were the first to get plundered,” she wrote. “Then medications vanished from the drug stores. . . . Then the doctors left. . . . Many people stayed in town then. My mother’s colleague stayed and was killed in her own apartment; they tortured her for a long time, trying to find out where she hid her retirement payments. . . . Some people were killed on the highway. Someone was killed for his car. Many people faced demands for ransom for their family members. The former mayor was tortured and died. Hundreds of people vanished. Their go bags, their laminated documents, and their survival kits did not protect them.”

I met with Samoilenko at my hotel in Kyiv; she lives outside the city with her husband, the poet Anton Polunin, their two children, who are five and six, and a motley group of out-of-town relatives. She described her home as “a displaced people’s house,” too chaotic for a stranger to be invited in. Antratsyt, which Samoilenko left in her twenties, is an economically depressed mining town a mere twenty miles from the border with Russia. After leaving her home town, Samoilenko spent several years living in St. Petersburg; in the fall of 2013, she was attending a film festival in Kyiv when Viktor Yanukovych, the President of Ukraine at the time, backed out of signing an association agreement with the European Union. People gathered in Kyiv’s central square, Maidan Nezalezhnosti, and Samoilenko joined. The protest lasted several months, until February, 2014, when Yanukovych was deposed and fled the country for Russia. More than a hundred people died at the hands of the authorities during the protests of 2013-14, which Ukrainians call the Revolution of Dignity, or simply the Maidan. Russia occupied Crimea in March, 2014, and in April it attacked Ukraine from the east, cutting the Donetsk and Luhansk regions off from the rest of the country.

Antratsyt fell without a battle. “There were never any Ukrainian troops there,” Samoilenko told me. This did not mean that there was no bloodshed: people died at the hands of thugs who declared themselves in charge and claimed to be hunting down real and imaginary opponents, and other thugs who robbed, killed, and marauded. Samoilenko, like thousands of other Ukrainians, started organizing aid to people living under the occupation. For the next three years, she raised money for medication and other essentials to be delivered to Antratsyt by a van; the vehicle would then return with families fleeing the region, most often because their members needed medical treatment. (About a million and a half Ukrainians, former residents of Crimea and the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, are currently registered as internally displaced persons.) Samoilenko estimates that she has helped fifty people move to Kyiv. It took her some time to persuade her family to leave, but eventually six family members, including Samoilenko’s parents, joined her in Kyiv; she still supports them. (She earns money as a marketing consultant.)

“People can’t imagine what occupation is like,” Samoilenko said. “The scariest thing is when the lights go off everywhere and the hospitals have no power, and their generators don’t work because it turns out they were never maintained. I think the current situation is harder for me because I’ve had that experience of helplessness. But I’m not scared. Fear is what you feel when you don’t know what can happen. But I do.” So, even though Samoilenko knows that it’s impossible to prepare fully for war, she is making preparations. She would like to get her parents and kids out of Kyiv, perhaps buy a house in a remote village on the western edge of Ukraine. She liked one online listing in particular. “It’s way up in the Carpathian Mountains. There is clean water coming from the peak. Plus, it’s so beautiful there, like in ‘The Sound of Music.’ ” The house is cheap—just fifteen thousand dollars. Samoilenko doesn’t have fifteen thousand dollars, but if things get bad she will figure out how to get it.

For now, she will stay in Kyiv and do what she can. She and Polunin stockpiled a bit of gasoline: five ten-litre cannisters. “If it’s not too cold, we can run the generator for an hour or two a day, to prepare food and charge our devices. After that, we can play piano by candlelight.” They have invited eight friends to move into their house if the city is under attack. “It’s easier to survive as a commune, even just to watch the kids if adults need to go out to get firewood.” Back during the revolution, Samoilenko learned first aid and how to otherwise assist trained medics. In January, she took two refresher courses, and she is thinking of signing up for civilian reserves.

Back in 2014, Ukrainians formed ad-hoc volunteer fighting battalions to help the underequipped, underprepared regular armed forces. Since then, civilian resistance units have been legalized and formalized. A law that took effect on January 1st makes such units, now known as Territorial Defense Troops, a separate part of the armed forces under the command of a specially appointed general. Today, according to Anton Holoborodko, a journalist who acts as a press spokesman for Kyiv Territorial Defense, what began as a largely self-run volunteer organization is in the process of being integrated into the Army.

Holoborodko and I met at a café near the Maidan, where he works out of a small office, producing his own YouTube news show. He is thirty-two, blond, with a face that appears perfectly round. “Before 2015, my only connection to the military was that my father was an officer,” Holoborodko said. He was working as a journalist, first at the Maidan, then in Crimea and the occupied east. “And then I thought, Wait, there is a mobilization drive going on. Why haven’t I signed up?” He served for fourteen months but never saw combat: his battalion stayed in the second line of defense. “I guess I was lucky, though at the time I felt cheated. When I was discharged, I thought I’d never want to have anything to do with the military again. But gradually I came to understand that our neighbor to the east—rather, their political regime—has a problematic relationship with reality and can go crazy any day. And then what am I going to do? It occurred to me that I should think about what my role should be.” In the summer of 2020, Holoborodko signed up as a civilian volunteer.

While we talked, his phone kept ringing: people who find him through social media want to find out how to sign up for Territorial Defense; journalists want to report on civilian reserves. So far, about five hundred people have signed contracts with Territorial Defense in Kyiv. The week we met, Holoborodko said he had arranged some twenty interviews with volunteers. Every Saturday, about eighty people (“That’s a lot!” Holoborodko protested, before I had a chance to say otherwise), most of them men, between the ages of eighteen and fifty-seven, gather somewhere in or just outside Kyiv for training exercises. They work on their urban- or forest-combat maneuvers, using prop guns and other equipment that they’ve bought with their own money. Holoborodko feels lucky that his girlfriend is supportive of his work. She is willing to drive him across town for exercises on Saturday mornings, whereas other volunteers’ partners have been known to complain about family money going to buy so much as a multi-tool to use in the drills.

“Everyone ought to decide who they are going to be,” Holoborodko said. “If they are going to be civilians, they should probably plan to evacuate. If they are going to be soldiers, they should probably sign up for Territorial Defense right now.” On January 22nd, Holoborodko called his parents, who live a couple of hundred miles east of Kyiv, and instructed them, “If you lose cell service and the Internet, get in the car and drive. I want to see you here within ten hours.” They agreed. Holoborodko has a few cannisters of gas set aside for his girlfriend and her fifteen-year-old son to make their way to Western Ukraine, if need be. But, although he has given his parents clear instructions, he is not sure how to determine when it’s time to send his family members on their way. (He will himself remain in Kyiv to fight.) “The moment when it’s time to evacuate has not been determined with certainty,” he said. “But it is known when it will be too late: when the city is being bombed from the air.”

Until then, Lena Samoilenko plans to party. “I am using all my free time to see people,” she told me. Recently, she rented a hotel room with friends; they talked until dawn, then piled into a car and drove to the Kyiv Sea, a giant man-made reservoir. “Along the way, we listened to the best music in the world.” She played a bit of Devendra Banhart’s “Shabop Shalom” on her phone. “It’s fun, as un-warlike as it gets. We got there—it was freezing, the sea was pushing up large blocks of ice. We lit sparklers, but it was windy and my clothes nearly caught on fire. It was wonderful.” She showed me the singed cuff of her jacket, an oversized thrifted men’s black suit jacket. She also showed me, on her phone, a picture of a gold lamé dress that she really wants to buy for this period of partying.

When will it be time to stop partying, or to stop preparing and start acting? It’s often difficult to pinpoint the exact moment when a modern war has started, and it is particularly difficult to define a moment of substantive change in a country that has, in fact, been at war for eight years. “If they shut down the Internet, I’ll know,” Samoilenko said. In past conflicts, Russia has led with large cyberattacks. People mention other scenarios, such as the bombing of Kyiv, or a land invasion of the city, and then say that they are unimaginable. “On the other hand, the unimaginable has been happening for eight years,” Holoborodko said.

Toward the end of January, the Ukrainian government bore down on its stay-calm message. A think tank run by the former Defense Minister released a report stating that troops amassed by Russia near the Ukrainian border were not yet sufficient for a full-scale invasion. President Zelensky gathered foreign correspondents to scold them for writing “as though an army is marching down our streets.” Most Western media outlets do not have a permanent correspondent in Kyiv, or even in nearby European capitals such as Warsaw or Vienna, and yet more than two dozen journalists gathered to listen to the President in person. Their presence alone cast doubt on his message that there was no story there.

“There are more foreign correspondents here than at any point since 2014,” Nataliya Gumenyuk, a founder of the Public Interest Journalism Lab, told me. “I wonder: Are we normalizing the expectation of war? Or do they know something we don’t know? When is the moment we say, ‘Stop exaggerating,’ and when is the moment we must start getting ready?” Gumenyuk, who is thirty-eight, covered the Maidan and wrote a book on the occupation of Crimea. When I had dinner with her and her husband, Pyotr Ruzavin, at a restaurant with a tin ceiling, “Brooklyn pizza” on the menu, and an elaborate selection of teas, war seemed as unimaginable as ever. “I have been reading through all the scenarios,” Gumenyuk said. “Some Western papers are reporting that there will be an invasion of Kyiv by troops that will cross the border with Belarus, but how are they going to get here, through the swamps? It’s five hours by car.”

That’s really not far, I thought. “That’s really not far,” Ruzavin said.

Ruzavin, who is thirty, is a Russian journalist based in Moscow. He is tall and skinny and given to squinting and blushing when Gumenyuk corrects something that he has said, which is often. They were married four and a half years ago in Minsk, Belarus, a place that their friends from both Kyiv and Moscow could reach. They’ve continued to work in their respective cities (Ruzavin has worked for several outlets that the Russian state has branded as “foreign agents”), so theirs is a commuter marriage—which is to say, Ruzavin commutes to Kyiv. Commuting has become progressively harder. There have been no direct flights since 2015. When COVID hit, the overnight train from Moscow stopped running, too. Ruzavin took to flying through Minsk, but, after Belarus forced down a Ryanair flight in order to arrest a dissident who was on board, European airlines stopped flying there. Now Ruzavin commutes via Istanbul or Amsterdam, a long and expensive journey.

Ruzavin thinks that the declaration of war will come by way of Russian television: when prominent media personalities start calling for an invasion of Kyiv or for abolishing the Ukrainian state, it will have begun. “They are the sirens of war,” he said. He was scheduled to fly back to Moscow in mid-January, but postponed his departure until after the Beijing Olympics. It’s a superstition of sorts: Russia launched its offensive against Georgia on the first day of the Summer Games in Beijing, in 2008, and invaded Crimea as the Winter Games in Sochi were winding down. (A rumor, vehemently denied by China, has it that Putin had promised Xi Jinping not to start a big war during the Olympics this time.)

“I’ve been keeping an eye on the Kerch Strait,” east of Crimea, Gumenyuk said, continuing to think through the possible signs that a new stage in the war has begun. “Or a cyberattack—they could take the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant out of commission. Two weeks ago, when someone hacked a dozen leading government sites, I thought it might have begun. But it was only the home pages—the hacks didn’t go deeper.”

“Long story short, if it starts, the first thing they will do is hit anti-aircraft defense sites,” Ruzavin said.

“They’ll go after the infrastructure. Or maybe something strange will happen in the east, like a child dying from a land mine or from a strike by a supposed Ukrainian drone,” Gumenyuk said.

“Russian diplomats will leave Kyiv,” Ruzavin said. “We could tell by tracking them, if only we could identify them.”

“We keep arguing about how to prepare,” Gumenyuk said. “But for what? For not having Internet? How can you prepare for bombings? They just should never happen. But now on the Internet you can find a complete map of Kyiv bomb shelters.”

“Where is our bomb shelter?” Ruzavin asked.

“It’s in the next building over. I told you we should go check it out.”

“That building has a dental office in the basement,” Ruzavin said.

Mykola Balaban is a historian who interrupted his postgraduate studies, in 2014, to join the military, and who now runs a governmental center that studies Russian disinformation. He told me that he has been travelling the country and finding the same sense of “quiet disquiet” everywhere. The government’s efforts to project confidence and counteract panic, he said, are hindered by the legacy of the Soviet Union. The Chernobyl nuclear reactor is located in Ukraine, and every family here remembers the government’s efforts to stem well-founded panic after it exploded, in 1986. “So, if the government tells you that you shouldn’t be running to exchange your currency, that means you should run as fast as you can,” Balaban said. “That’s the Soviet legacy. Add to that a postcolonial distrust of the élites: almost no one in Ukraine treats the government with the same kind of reverence as they do in Russia.”

Nor does the government project a unified front of confidence. During my week in Kyiv, I attended a series of different events connected to Holocaust Memorial Day. At every one of them, government officials—including a Deputy Prime Minister—pleaded with their visiting foreign counterparts to go back to their governments and ask them to work to prevent a war.

The one reassuring message that seemed to gain traction in Kyiv last week was the report, stating that Russia was not ready for a full-scale invasion. I met with Andriy Zagorodnyuk, the former Minister of Defense who co-authored the report, two days after it came out. Zagorodnyuk is an entrepreneur who joined the war effort in 2014: his factory started manufacturing ambulances and heating stoves for Army tents and shipping them to the front, for free. Soon, he was drafted to help reform the Defense Ministry. In 2019, Zelensky appointed him as Minister of Defense, but after a few months Zagorodnyuk resigned and started a think tank, the Centre for Defence Strategies.

“You know what I don’t understand?” he said. “Russia has not made any official threats. All the information about this looming invasion comes by way of intelligence services. There is a huge number of analysts who claim to know what Putin is planning to do, which is impossible, because Russia never has just one plan of action.” Zagorodnyuk, who was twisting a small stack of his own business cards in his hands, started laying them out on the conference table in front of him, to illustrate a sort of logical con that Putin is trying to impose on the West. First card: Russia has the capability to invade Ukraine. Second card: Its amassing of troops at the border is proof of this capability. Third: Consequently, an attack is imminent. Fourth: If the attack happens, Russia will win. Fifth: the United States and NATO, alarmed, should therefore negotiate with Putin, which is what he wanted all along.

On the other hand, Ukraine has a far larger and better trained military than it did eight years ago. It also has a civil society that has honed its self-organization skills over the course of the revolution and war. “We know for certain that, whatever part of Ukraine Russia occupies, Ukraine will turn the experience of staying there into hell for Russia,” Zagorodnyuk said. “The military will split up into small units of ten to fifty people and continue fighting, making it unbearable to maintain the occupation. Putin should know that, if he hasn’t completely lost his mind.”

Zagorodnyuk had been giving interviews all day, saying the same thing over and over again. He happened to be using a conference room at the solar-power company run by his wife, Alina Sviderskaya. It was Sviderskaya who had come downstairs to fetch me when I arrived, and in the elevator she told me that she had been thinking of going to Western Ukraine. But hearing her husband talk about his report had calmed her down. Maybe it wasn’t time to flee just yet.


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Monday, August 2, 2021

RSN: FOCUS: Alexander Vindman | What I Heard in the White House Basement

 

 

Reader Supported News
02 August 21

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Alexander Vindman. (photo: Reuters)
FOCUS: Alexander Vindman | What I Heard in the White House Basement
Alexander Vindman, The Atlantic
Vindman writes: "I knew the president had clear and straightforward talking points - I'd written them."


ne phone call changed my life.

On Thursday, July 25, 2019, I was seated at the table in one of the two Situation Rooms in the basement of the West Wing. The bigger room is famous from movies and TV shows, but this room is smaller, more typically businesslike: a long wooden table with 10 chairs, maybe a dozen more chairs against wood-paneled walls, and a massive TV screen. This was the room where President Barack Obama and his team watched a feed of the Osama bin Laden raid. This morning, the screen was off. We were all focused intently on the triangular conference-call speaker in the middle of the table. President Donald Trump’s communications team was placing a call to President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, and we were there to listen.

I was a 44-year-old U.S. Army lieutenant colonel assigned to a position equivalent to that of a two-star general, three levels above my rank. Since July 2018, I’d been at the National Security Council, serving as the director for Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Russia. Recently, deep concerns had been growing throughout the U.S. foreign-policy community regarding two of the countries I was responsible for. We’d long been confused by the president’s policy of accommodation and appeasement toward Russia. But now there were new, rapidly emerging worries. This time the issue was the president’s inexplicable hostility toward a U.S. partner crucial to our Russia strategy: Ukraine.

Ukraine has been a scene of tension and violence since at least the Middle Ages. In 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, seizing the Crimean Peninsula, home to millions and representing nearly 5 percent of Ukraine’s territory, and attacking its industrial heartland, the Donbass, cleaving even more territory and millions of Ukrainians away from the capital, Kyiv.

By 2019, little had changed. Russia’s annexation and incorporation of the Crimea into the Russian Federation persisted, and Russian military and security forces and their proxy separatists continued to occupy the Donbass. Ukraine’s security was precarious, but the country’s importance as a bulwark against Russian aggression in Eastern Europe had only grown. The region could not have been more sensitive, volatile, or crucial to U.S. and NATO interests. Ukrainian leaders had recently assured National Security Adviser John Bolton that they were content to play the role of a buffer against Russian aggression; geography left them little choice. But they did request aid. Actually, they insisted that if Ukrainian blood were to be spilled to defend both the country’s independence and the freedom and prosperity of Europe, the least the West could do was support their efforts.

And yet, only weeks earlier, the White House had abruptly put a hold on nearly $400 million in U.S. security aid that Congress had earmarked for Ukraine. This was money that Ukraine badly needed to fend off the continuous threat of Russian aggression. The abrupt, unexplained White House hold was baffling. Not only was it a 180-degree turn from the stated policy the entire U.S. government supported, but it was also contrary to U.S. national-security interests in the region.

The national-security apparatus had gotten used to the president’s inattention to any policy, let alone foreign policy, so this sudden White House interest in Ukraine was something new, and deeply unsettling. We feared that on a whim, the president might send out a barely coherent tweet or make an offhand public remark or an impulsive decision that could throw carefully crafted policy—official policy of the United States—into total disarray. Because it’s not as if Trump ever made active changes in policy. Indeed, the interagency staff had never been alerted by the West Wing to any shift in national direction. The official Ukraine policy was, in fact, a matter of broad consensus in the diplomatic and military parts of the administration. What exactly, we wondered, was the president doing? How could we advise him to reverse course on this out-of-nowhere hold on funding for Ukraine? If he didn’t lift the hold, something could blow up at any time.

My role was to coordinate all diplomatic, informational, military, and economic policy for the region, across all government departments and agencies. In recent weeks, the community of professional foreign-policy staff within the government had been scrambling to sort out what was going on. Everybody was trying to understand these unsettling developments and to come up with ways of convincing the president that the U.S. had a vital national-security interest in deterring Russian aggression and supporting Ukraine’s independence. I proposed and was the driving force behind an interagency security-assistance review—which was not, as was later claimed by the Oval Office, a review justifying the hold on the funds, but a means of bringing the discussion out of the shadows and into normal foreign-policy channels.

By the time I sat down at the table in the basement conference room on July 25, preparing to listen to Trump’s call with President Zelensky, my workdays had become consumed by the Oval Office hold on funds. On July 18, I’d convened what we call a Sub-Policy Coordinating Committee, a get-together of senior policy makers for the whole community of interest on Ukraine, from every agency and department, to work up a recommendation for reversing the hold on the funds. By July 21, that meeting had been upgraded to a Policy Coordination Committee, requiring even more administrative and intellectual effort, which convened again two days later. We even scheduled a higher-level Deputies Committee meeting for the day after the Zelensky call. Chaired by the deputy national security adviser, these meetings bring together all of the president’s Cabinet deputies and require an enormous amount of advance research and coordination.

Many of us were operating on little sleep, working more than the usual NSC 14-hour days. I’d barely seen my wife, Rachel, or my 8-year-old daughter, Eleanor, in weeks.

In the week leading up to the call, I’d discerned a potentially dangerous wrinkle in the Ukraine situation. Actions by the president’s personal attorney Rudy Giuliani suggested a hidden motive for the White House’s sudden interest in Ukraine. Operating far outside normal policy circles, Giuliani had been on a mysterious errand that also seemed to involve the U.S. ambassador to the European Union, Gordon Sondland, and the White House chief of staff, Mick Mulvaney. Just a few weeks earlier, I’d participated in a meeting at the White House at which Sondland made a suggestion to some visiting top Ukrainian officials: If President Zelensky pursued certain investigations, he might be rewarded with a visit to the White House. These proposed investigations would be of former Vice President and current Democratic candidate Joe Biden and his son Hunter.

Sondland’s proposal was clearly improper. Little could have been more valuable to the new, young, untested leader of Ukraine—the country most vulnerable to Russia—than a one-on-one meeting with the president of the United States. A bilateral visit would signal to Russia and the rest of the world a staunch U.S. commitment to having Ukraine’s back as well as U.S. support for Zelensky’s reform and anti-corruption agenda, which was crucial to Ukraine’s prosperity and to closer integration with the European Union. That’s what all of us in the policy community wanted, of course. But making such a supremely valuable piece of U.S. diplomacy dependent on an ally’s carrying out investigations into U.S. citizens—not to mention the president’s political adversary—was unheard of. Before I’d fully picked up on what was going on, that meeting with the Ukrainians had been abruptly broken up by Bolton. But in a subsequent meeting among U.S. officials, at which Sondland reiterated the idea, I told him point-blank that I thought his proposition was wrong and that the NSC would not be party to such an enterprise.

I wanted to believe Sondland was a loose cannon, floating wild ideas of his own, with support from a few misguided colleagues. But he wasn’t a freelancing outlier like Giuliani. He was an appointed government official. His maneuverings had me worried.

One other thing made me apprehensive. The call had originally been proposed for July 22, the day after Ukraine’s parliamentary elections, and its stated purpose was to congratulate Zelensky on his party’s landslide victory. Then it was abruptly rescheduled for the morning of July 25 with no explanation. On the way over to the White House, I’d made a suggestion to my new boss, Tim Morrison.

“You know, we probably want to get the lawyers involved,” I said, “to listen in.” I meant the NSC legal team. Tim and I were going down the stairs from my third-floor office in the Old Executive Office Building, the massive five-story structure immediately adjacent to the White House, heading for the West Wing basement.

Tim gave me a sardonic look.

“Why?” he asked.

“Because this could go all haywire,” I replied.

Tim dismissed my suggestion out of hand. Knowing that Fiona Hill, my recently departed boss at the National Security Council, had briefed him on the July 10 meeting with Sondland, and thinking him wise enough to recognize the risks, I didn’t understand his resistance. He’d replaced Fiona only days earlier, and I was still getting used to his management style.

Fiona had hired me. Highly regarded in her field, she was a brilliant and thoughtful scholar and analyst with a vast global network. She’d previously served in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as a national-intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia, and she’d written the book, literally, on Putin. Fiona was a great boss—not that we were always in sync: I’d often wanted to be more forward-leaning on policy prescriptions, and, with a strong sense of the political minefields, Fiona would pull me back, sometimes to my frustration. Still, we respected and appreciated each other. Fiona had expected to leave soon after Bolton came in as national security adviser, but then she’d agreed to stay through the fall, then spring, then summer, and maybe even later. Tim, a Bolton protégé, really wanted the promotion, however, and by June it was clear that Fiona would be leaving.

Caustic and bristling, Tim had little expertise in Eastern Europe and Russia. Unlike Fiona, who sought out expert input, he was clearly eager to establish a lot of control. Still, I thought Tim might be willing to push harder and more directly than Fiona had. Maybe we’d work well together. He naturally wanted to get the Ukraine relationship back on track and notch some successes, as did Bolton, and I expected Tim to encourage me to keep organizing the policy consensus for recommending lifting the hold on funds.

And so, despite all my apprehension, as I sat at the conference table and heard the president’s call being connected, I had hope, too. This call could well be pleasant, friendly, and productive. The president liked winners, and Zelensky’s whole party had scored a huge victory. I knew the president had clear and straightforward talking points—I’d written them. He was to congratulate Zelensky, show support for Ukraine’s reform and anti-corruption agenda, and urge caution regarding the Russians; they would try to manipulate and test Zelensky early on. If Trump stayed on script, we could begin to get U.S. policy for the region back where it needed to be. I had some confidence in Zelensky, too. I’d met him in Ukraine; he was funny, charismatic, smart.

The White House operator said, “The parties are now connected.” Trump began speaking, and I knew right away that everything was going wrong.

I was born in Soviet Ukraine and lost my mother at the age of 3. After her death, our family fled the Soviet Union. My father brought me and my identical twin brother, Yevgeny; our older brother, Len; and our maternal grandmother to the United States, where we settled in Brooklyn. A top Soviet civil engineer and administrator, my father started over from scratch in America.

He raised three boys, did physical labor for a living, learned English, and began to succeed in our adopted country. America lived up to its promise to reward hard work and patriotic dedication. My twin brother and I went to college and then directly into the military and a life of public service; my older brother joined the Army Reserve, and my stepbrother, Alex, joined the Marines after high school. Not only the United States, but the U.S. Army became my home, and my Army career took me to places and put me in positions I never could have imagined: from combat service in Iraq to a diplomatic and Defense Intelligence Agency posting in Moscow; and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the political and military expert on Russia to the National Security Council as a director with responsibility for Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and the Caucasus. By 2019, I was on track for a promotion to full colonel. I’d even gained the coveted prize of admission to the U.S. Army War College, a senior service school. I had served, and my service had been rewarded. This 44-year period was the first phase of my life.

The second phase of my life began on July 25, 2019.

As I listened to the president’s voice rising from the conference-table speaker, I was rapidly scribbling in my large green government notebook. And my heart was sinking.

“I will say that we do a lot for Ukraine,” Trump was telling Zelensky. “We spend a lot of effort and a lot of time, much more than the European countries are doing, and they should be helping you more than they are. Germany does almost nothing for you.”

The president’s tone was detached, unfriendly. His voice was lower and deeper than usual, as if he were having a bad morning. He wasn’t in the room with us—he was taking the call in the residence, but that wasn’t unusual for him. He was routinely unavailable, and certainly not present in the Oval Office, until late morning or early afternoon.

Zelensky is a comedian by profession. He was telling self-deprecating jokes, making fun of his own poll numbers and saying that he had to win more elections to speak regularly with President Trump. My fluency in Ukrainian allowed me to catch the nuance. As head of state for a vulnerable and dependent country, Zelensky was giving it everything he had: trying to build a rapport with the president, flattering a notoriously egotistical character, steering the conversation toward the military aid, and gently trying to elicit the personal White House visit that he and his country so desperately needed.

Trump wasn’t responsive. Monotone and standoffish, he remained stubbornly aloof to Zelensky’s efforts to make a personal connection. The president wasn’t using my talking points at all. He may never have seen them. As the conversation progressed, my worst fears about the call kept being reconfirmed. Off on a tangent of his own, the president was aggravating a potentially explosive foreign-policy situation.

And so I did what we in the foreign-policy community so often found ourselves doing during the Trump presidency. I began to accept that all our hopes for today’s chat had been dashed. I had to move on. In the face of the president’s erratic behavior, that’s what we’d all learned to do. I began mentally walking through new ways to rectify the situation. If the hold on security assistance to Ukraine was not lifted by early August, the Department of Defense would not be able to send the funds required by Congress. I was thinking fast. There was a tentative plan for Bolton to take a personal trip to the region I covered. If Bolton met with Zelensky on that trip, could we get another bite from Trump, maybe start shifting things back in the right direction? Maybe the secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, could have a phone conversation with Zelensky and report back to the president that Ukraine warranted a shift in the antagonistic approach coming from the Oval Office? And I could always redouble my efforts to coordinate an interagency position: Maybe the unanimity of government certainty that aid to Ukraine was a national-security imperative would sway the president and get him to lift the hold.

It may seem surprising that my colleagues and I were busy thinking up ways to pursue a Ukraine policy out of sync with the direction that the president of the United States himself now seemed to be taking. But seemed is the key word. The policy of U.S. support for Ukraine had remained in place all along, with the unanimous consent of the secretary of state, all the Cabinet deputies, and bipartisan congressional leadership, including Trump’s most loyal followers: Senator Ron Johnson of Wisconsin, Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, and the chairman of the powerful Armed Services Committee, Senator Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma. It’s true that odd, outlying data points contradicted the policy: Giuliani, Sondland, Mulvaney, and their mysterious errand; the hold on funds; the president’s negative tone on this call with Zelensky. But these indicators were consistent with a pattern in which the president made ill-conceived decisions only to retract them later.

The fact is that because Trump never provided any policy guidance, nobody in responsible circles—people far senior to me—ever took his remarks seriously. They’d wait to see if anything more substantive confirmed what he’d said, continuing, in the meantime, to pursue agreed-upon directions. Because Tim Morrison, my new boss at NSC, had also directed that we continue on course and not treat anything the president might say as a change in policy, there was really nothing else to do.

From the speaker, I could hear Zelensky trying to work Trump around to the U.S. security money for Ukraine.

“I would also like to thank you for your great support in the area of defense,” Zelensky said. “We are ready to continue to cooperate for the next steps. Specifically, we are almost ready to buy more Javelins from the United States for defense purposes.” He was referring to a U.S.-made infrared-guided antitank weapon, the Javelin, to be used against Russian armored vehicles.

The president didn’t miss a beat.

“I would like you to do us a favor, though.”

I paused in my note-taking.

The president began rolling out an outlandish, discredited conspiracy theory that Giuliani had recently been promoting publicly. According to this theory, the 2016 hacking of the Democratic National Committee email server had been directed not by the government of Russia, as all U.S. intelligence had shown, but by some rich Ukrainian. The president told Zelensky that he’d like him to look into the matter. To that end, he asked Zelensky to cooperate with the U.S. attorney general, William Barr. The president also blamed actors in Ukraine for Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation of Trump’s possible abuse of power and suggested that Zelensky could improve his country’s relationship with the United States by pursuing and proving this bizarre conspiracy.

Not surprisingly, Zelensky took up the subject with alacrity, though he was careful to speak in general terms.

“We are open for any future cooperation,” he assured Trump. “We are ready to open a new page on cooperation in relations between the United States and Ukraine.”

Zelensky responded favorably to Trump’s criticism of the recent firing of the corrupt Ukrainian prosecutors Yuriy Lutsenko and Viktor Shokin—“a very good prosecutor,” Trump called Lutsenko—and he assured the president that he would appoint a credible, reliable general prosecutor and surround himself only with the kind of people of whom Trump would approve. Zelensky said he would be happy to see Giuliani in Ukraine at any time. And, of course, he very much hoped to meet face-to-face with the president himself.

Though I was growing more unsettled, I’d started taking notes again. I still couldn’t get a handle on what was going on, but I’d entirely given up hope for anything positive coming out of the discussion.

“The other thing,” the president continued: “There’s a lot of talk about Biden’s son.”

My head snapped up. I looked quickly around the table. Were others tracking this?

“That Biden stopped the prosecution,” the president said.

Burisma, the Ukrainian company on whose board Biden’s son Hunter served, had indeed been investigated during the Obama administration. But the investigation had been into activities that took place prior to Hunter Biden’s joining the board. There was nothing to support the allegation that Joe Biden had a personal stake in firing Shokin—that he had stopped an investigation, as Trump was now saying, in order to protect his son from investigation. In reality, as everyone in the foreign-policy community knew, the prosecutor had been fired for a lack of investigative rigor. Even if there had been anything to this Biden story, the president’s bringing up such an allegation against a political rival, or any American citizen at all, and demanding an investigation on a call with a foreign head of state was crossing the brightest of bright lines.

But now the president went even further.

“A lot of people want to find out about that,” he told Zelensky. “So whatever you can do with the attorney general would be great. Biden went around bragging that he stopped the prosecution, so if you can look into it …”

I could hardly believe what I was hearing. I knew that Giuliani had been publicly pushing the false Biden story. And I’d been disturbed to hear Sondland suggest to Ukrainian officials that if Ukraine pursued certain investigations, Zelensky would get a White House visit. Still, for all my long-running concerns about Trump’s approach to Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, and for all of my immediate concerns about how this call with Zelensky might go, I had refused to imagine that I would ever hear a president of the United States ask a foreign head of state—a state dependent on vital U.S. security aid that Congress had earmarked for it, thus binding the executive branch to deliver that aid—to, in essence, manufacture compromising material on an American citizen in exchange for that support. The president was brazenly involving not only himself but also Attorney General Barr, as well as his personal attorney Giuliani, in a wholly improper effort to subvert U.S. foreign policy in order to game an election.

My glance around the table confirmed that I wasn’t the only one taking in what was happening. Across from me sat Tim, who less than an hour earlier had rejected my suggestion to get legal to listen in. A lawyer himself, Tim has an expressive face. He, too, was looking up, eyes darting around. Then he took a deep breath as if to say, Oh, so it’s that kind of call.

Jennifer Williams, of the State Department, was sitting next to me at the table. I’m not sure how much she picked up at that precise moment, but later she said that she had a concern. A press officer was also on the call; she wasn’t missing any nuance. A European immigrant like me, she’d served in Eastern Europe and knew how certain governments there operated. They operated like this.

Now we knew: This was what Giuliani, Sondland, and Mulvaney had been up to. This was the president’s purpose in placing a hold on the funds to Ukraine. He meant to use lifting the hold as an inducement for Zelensky to dig up dirt on Biden. His real purpose in making this call had nothing to do with repairing Ukraine policy. He was extorting Ukraine to damage a political challenger at home and boost his own political fortunes.

Meanwhile, Zelensky, whose comedy background made him good at reading his audience, started kvelling about the time he’d stayed in Trump Tower in New York City; about the Ukrainian friends he had in the United States; about all the American oil that Ukraine was planning to buy; and about the prize: how much he’d like to visit the White House. And he assured Trump that he would pursue a transparent inquiry into Hunter Biden. That was enough.

At last the president became friendly, very friendly: “Whenever you would like to come to the White House,” he said, “feel free to call. Give us a date, and we’ll work that out. I look forward to seeing you.”

This was one of Zelensky’s key goals for the call, so he expressed delight at the offer and reciprocated by offering to host Trump in Kyiv or meet him in Poland. As the call wound down, Trump again congratulated Zelensky, in his way.

“I’m not sure it was so much of an upset,” he said, referring to the Ukrainian elections, “but congratulations.”

“Thank you, Mr. President,” said Zelensky. “Bye-bye.”

The next thing I remember clearly is being back in the Old Executive Office Building, in the office of the chief ethics counsel for the NSC. This was Yevgeny Vindman, my identical twin brother. A lawyer, Yevgeny has had a long military career, including serving as an 82nd Airborne platoon leader and as a judge advocate general. Our careers had kept us apart since our college days, but in 2016, Yevgeny and I started working in the same building at the Pentagon, and now we were both at the NSC, in offices across from each other. We’d been through a lot together, and like most identical twins, we share something of a world of our own. Like many brothers, we can be a bit rowdy with each other, competitive in a friendly way, indulging in some good-natured mock insults.

They say that everybody has a quiet inner voice of good judgment.

In my life, that quiet inner voice has been a real person: my brother. Our unique relationship was about to matter more than it ever had before. The walk that morning from the White House basement up to my brother’s office is pretty much a blur but I do remember looking around the conference room when the meeting broke up, knowing that others, including my boss, had heard what I’d heard. In that moment, I realized something right away. Nobody else was going to say anything about it. I was the person most knowledgeable about and officially responsible for the portfolio. If I didn’t report up the chain of command what I knew, no one might ever find out what the president was up to with Ukraine and the 2020 U.S. election. That’s why I went straight to Yevgeny’s office.

Regardless of any impact on the president, or of the domestic- and foreign-policy consequences, or of personal costs, I had no choice but to report what I’d heard. That duty to report is an important component of U.S. Army values and of the oath I’d taken to support and defend the U.S. Constitution. Despite the president’s constitutional role as commander in chief, at the apex of the military chain of command—in fact, because of his role—I had an obligation to report misconduct.

Yevgeny, who had the highest security clearances, was therefore uniquely positioned to advise me on the proper procedures, and I knew that he would support my doing my duty. He would protect, at all costs, my telling the truth. He would never be swayed by any institutional or presidential interest in covering it up.

I made sure to close the door behind me. “If what I just heard becomes public,” I told my brother, “the president will be impeached.”

It’s been a year of turmoil for the country, and for my family and me. I’m no longer at the National Security Council. I’m no longer an officer in the U.S. Army. I’m living in the great unknown, and so, to a great degree, is our country.

But because I’ve never had any doubt about the fitness of my decision, I remain at peace with the consequences that continue to unfold.



This article has been adapted from Alexander Vindman’s new book, Here, Right Matters: An American Story.

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