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Showing posts with label DEPT OF JUSTICE. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DEPT OF JUSTICE. Show all posts

Thursday, December 23, 2021

RSN: FOCUS: Merrick Garland Needs to Speak Up

 


 

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Judge Merrick Garland testifies at his confirmation hearing for attorney general. (photo: Getty)
FOCUS: Merrick Garland Needs to Speak Up
Quinta Jurecic, Andrew Kent and Benjamin Wittes, Lawfare
Excerpt: "Attorney General Merrick Garland is taking a great deal of criticism these days."

Attorney General Merrick Garland is taking a great deal of criticism these days.

He’s being attacked for not having indicted former President Trump, for not having brought cases faster against witnesses who have defied the Jan. 6 committee, and for not having moved more aggressively against political figures for their supposed involvement in the Jan. 6 insurrection.

These criticisms speak to genuine frustrations with the slow pace of department action. They are also based on two flawed assumptions.

The first is the assumption that the evidence and equities would support prosecutions and, consequently, that the absence of criminal cases reveals weakness or hypercaution on the Justice Department’s part. This may be the case—but it may not. The absence of prosecutions could also reflect inadequacies in the evidence needed to bring cases.

The second problem is the confusion of what has not happened with what has not happened yet. The Justice Department can be very busy without making a lot of noise. The fact that indictments have not materialized so far does not mean they won’t appear tomorrow—or the day after.

But nearly a year into his tenure as attorney general, though much of the criticism of Garland has been unfair or at least premature, the attorney general does have something to answer for: his relative silence.

When Joe Biden nominated Garland to be attorney general, Garland spoke explicitly about Edward Levi, the former president of the University of Chicago and a noted legal scholar who served as attorney general under President Gerald Ford.

“Ed Levi and Griffin Bell, the first Attorneys General appointed after Watergate, had enunciated the norms that would ensure the department’s adherence to the rule of law,” Garland said in his acceptance speech:

Those policies included guaranteeing the independence of the department from partisan influence and law enforcement investigations, regulating communications with the White House, establishing guidelines for FBI investigations, ensuring respect for the professionalism of DOJ’s lawyers and agents, and setting our principles to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Those policies became part of the DNA of every career lawyer and agent.

Garland’s mission as attorney general, he stressed, would be “to reaffirm those policies as the principles upon which the department operates.” And he quoted another speech from Levi’s swearing in: “Nothing can more weaken the quality of life, or more imperil the realization of the goals we all hold dear, than our failure to make clear by words and deed that our law is not the instrument of partisan purpose.”

At Garland’s first speech to the Justice Department staff, he once again invoked Levi:

The only way we can succeed and retain the trust of the American people is to adhere to the norms that have become part of the DNA of every Justice Department employee since Edward Levi’s stint as the first post-Watergate Attorney General.

As I said at the announcement of my nomination, those norms require that like cases be treated alike. That there not be one rule for Democrats and another for Republicans; One rule for friends and another for foes; One rule for the powerful and another for the powerless; One rule for the rich and another for the poor; Or different rules depending upon one's race or ethnicity. At his swearing in, Attorney General Levi said: “If we are to have a government of laws and not of men, then it takes dedicated men and women to accomplish this through their zeal and determination, and also through fairness and impartiality. And I know that this Department always has had such dedicated men and women.” I, too, know that this Department has and always has had such dedicated people. I am honored to work with you once again. Together, we will show the American people by word and deed that the Department of Justice pursues equal justice and adheres to the rule of law.

Garland is not the only senior Justice Department official to refer to Levi’s legacy in describing the mission of the Justice Department under President Biden. At her confirmation hearing, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco declared that:

My first job in the Department was as counsel to Janet Reno, the first woman Attorney General. She hung a portrait of Attorney General Edward Levi in her conference room. It signaled her commitment to continuing Levi’s post-Watergate work to ensure the Department’s independence. It symbolized for me then, and is a reminder today, that the Department’s leaders have a duty to remember and reaffirm the values of the institution. When Attorney General Levi was asked what he thought the Department needed most after Watergate, he responded, “A soul.”

There’s a very good reason the senior Justice Department leadership keeps pointing to Ed Levi as a kind of founding father of the Justice Department they seek to restore. Indeed, we are sympathetic to the Justice Department’s need to revive the norms and practices of apolitical, independent, and professional justice that Levi did more than any other single person to create. Before Biden was even elected, in fact, one of us tweeted that Garland should be attorney general because he “is the closest thing the country has right now to an Ed Levi figure to restore the Justice Department.” Another of us wrote last spring an article in the Atlantic analyzing Levi’s legacy as a model for Garland.

Yet Garland seems to be ignoring one crucial aspect of Levi’s legacy: Ed Levi spoke a lot. Garland has been, in sharp contrast, largely invisible.

You don’t establish norms, or reestablish them, merely by modeling them. You establish them by articulating them, by talking about them, and by convincing people that they are the right way to behave. Levi understood this. His speeches and congressional testimonies as attorney general were numerous, highly substantive, and made arguments on behalf of the direction he wished to see the department go. They are a unique body of work among attorneys general, considered intellectually significant enough to have been collected and published as a volume by the University of Chicago Press.

Levi himself, we have learned, personally attached great importance to his speeches and testimonies. According to John Buckley, who served as one of Levi’s special assistants at the department and worked on some of the speeches, Levi wrote them himself—working on each with one of his special assistants.

Under Levi’s predecessor, William Saxbe, the public relations office would write the attorney general’s addresses. But Levi “​​believed in communication” and “labored over his speeches, testimony, [and] addresses,” Buckley said in a recent interview. He would “bang away at a manual typewriter” and edit the speeches with a fountain pen. “Those were his words.”

When he left office, his speeches were sufficiently significant to Levi that he bound them in a printed volume and gave a copy to each of the special assistants. It shows, Buckley says, “how much importance he attached to everything he wrote.”

Levi understood that certain Department of Justice issues were important enough that he needed to speak candidly and in detail about them to the public. For instance, the massive extent of the FBI’s “black bag jobs” and warrantless wiretapping of American citizens, sometimes for purposes of gathering political intelligence, had come to light through investigative journalism, congressional oversight, and some long overdue Department of Justice housecleaning started under Levi’s predecessor, Saxbe. J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI was also found to have gathered salacious material on a wide range of public figures, including members of Congress, and to have engaged in abusive and sometimes bizarre efforts to disrupt and discredit groups and individuals it considered radical. The revelations understandably lowered public opinion of the department’s integrity, and raised legitimate concerns about how deep the rot went and whether it was continuing.

Levi candidly owned up to mistakes: “[W]e all realize that in the past there have been grave abuses” by the FBI. And he named and described them. The “supervision by Attorneys General” of the FBI “has been sporadic, practically nonexistent, or ineffective.” He vowed to fix that and explained very specifically how he aimed to do it.

Levi also spoke repeatedly about programmatic efforts to remedy the sources of the problems. For example, he described to Congress and the public how he had tasked a Justice Department committee to draft detailed guidelines to rein in FBI misbehavior and increase oversight in sensitive areas, such as investigations that touched on political figures and political groups, the issuance of subpoenas to members of the press, and the use of informants. He repeatedly articulated the department’s legal views, along with policies designed to have warrantless wiretapping for foreign intelligence purposes narrowly circumscribed and subject to his personal oversight. He spoke publicly and specifically about the department’s work with Congress on a broad statute to bring under judicial oversight all domestic wiretapping for national security purposes. He described the outrageous FBI conduct toward Martin Luther King Jr. and described how he had tasked non-FBI officials to credibly and independently investigate it. Levi talked about how “important” it was that “the public get assurances that there are not such abuses” happening anymore. His goal was a “reconstruction” of the department and the public’s confidence in it, and a “reaffirmation of the effectiveness, independence and integrity of law enforcement agencies.”

Garland comes from a different school of thought on public engagement. During his long service as a judge, not only did he not give speeches or interviews describing his thinking and goals. He didn’t speak publicly at all. He didn’t speak at universities, as many judges do. He didn’t write law review articles. In his earlier stint at the Justice Department, he never cut much of a public figure either, though everyone understood that he was one of the most important people in the Main Justice building. He is steeped in the department’s culture of quietness, and he took that culture with him to the judiciary—where he was far more quiet than his contemporaries on the bench.

This quietness on Garland’s part is an expression of certain long-standing Justice Department norms. The department, according to this model, speaks almost entirely in court. It does not comment on pending investigative or prosecutorial matters outside of that. It does not behave politically—and shutting up is one very good way of avoiding saying things that could be construed in a political fashion. And the current moment has undoubtedly reinforced in Garland the wisdom of silence. His predecessor, William Barr, made all kinds of public comments that brought the department’s conduct into disrepute, speculating on what may have happened during the Russia investigation, for example. And before his firing, FBI Director James Comey was widely blasted for his comments about the Clinton email investigation during the last weeks before the 2016 election. So Garland may well have an instinct that the less he says the better.

The trouble is that, while silence by the attorney general reflects the department’s norms, it is a singularly bad means of establishing—or reestablishing—them.

In Garland’s defense, in deciding whether and how to speak publicly about past abuses and the current work of the department, he is facing problems that in some ways are tougher than those that confronted Levi. When Levi took office, the question about whether a former president who had potentially violated a number of criminal laws should be prosecuted had been resolved already: President Ford had granted a blanket pardon to Richard Nixon. Politically sensitive prosecutions of Watergate defendants had been handed off to a special prosecutor’s office. By contrast, questions about prosecuting Donald Trump and his associates must be faced by Garland himself and the departmental prosecutors working under him.

Levi’s credibility and freedom to operate were almost certainly enhanced by the facts that American politics, culture and media were less polarized in the 1970s than today, and that Levi’s criticisms of past abuses at the Department of Justice and White House often involved a current Republican administration criticizing a former Republican administration. Garland—unfortunately for him—must act and speak in a time of both fierce political tribalism and a social media environment that amplifies conflict, extreme positions and lies, all while laboring under the disability that criticisms from a Democratic attorney general of Republican predecessors will be discounted by many observers who will simply assume it to be politically motivated.

Despite our sympathy with the challenges facing Garland, his unwillingness to give the public any insight into his thinking seems ripe for criticism. It reflects a decision not to sell a vision—a vision that Garland clearly possesses and embodies—about how decisions should get made when the department is functioning properly.

There are a lot of such decisions before the department on which the public understanding and public debate would benefit from hearing the attorney general’s thinking. When Garland issued a policy strictly limiting contacts between the White House and the Justice Department—a policy very similar to ones that had been in place since the late 1970s—he could have given a speech explaining his goals and his choices. These policies seek to ensure that investigative and prosecutorial decisions about specific individuals are made based on law and fact, as evaluated by department lawyers and law enforcement professionals, not based on partisan or other improper considerations emanating from the White House. These norms were flagrantly abused during the Trump administration, and are in need of public reaffirmation. But Garland gave no such speech, leaving it to the press to report on the existence of the new policy and explain its significance to the public.

There are other instances in which more speaking would have been preferable. The department has reached plea agreements with a number of Jan. 6 defendants and has faced criticism, including from skeptical judges, for some of the relatively lenient sentences it has sought in those cases. What coordinating mechanisms have been set up to make sure that, as Garland himself put it, “like cases [are] treated alike”? And has there been any policy-level guidance about how different fact patterns should be charged?

Questions about when the department will act on criminal contempt referrals from Congress about witness refusals to comply with subpoenas from the Jan. 6 committee—such as that of Mark Meadows, Trump’s former chief of staff—are also fraught. It is, of course, correct for the department to avoid specific comments about individual pending matters. But this is not simply a collection of individual cases. It is a politically explosive and undeveloped area of law and practice that implicates fundamental separation of powers questions. The public would benefit from hearing reasoned discussion from the attorney general about how the department is approaching these referrals in broad terms. How is it balancing its institutional obligations to the legislature to bring contempt cases with its own interests in preserving a robust executive privilege?

Other areas would similarly benefit from public explanation. After the Sept. 11 attacks, the FBI and the Justice Department gave regular briefings on the investigation. There has been no such comparable effort to keep the public informed of the department’s progress in the Jan. 6 investigation—an investigation of similar scope and scale. Why not?

There is another, more internal question, about which Garland might turn the focus outward: What, if anything, is the department doing within its own ranks to try to rebuild norms and protect against potential misuse of law enforcement for partisan or personal ends in the future? Levi talked about this constantly; Garland has been quiet—except insofar as he has issued a new memorandum on White House contacts. But this question is critical, because it goes to the question of whether any of the changes he’s contemplating will outlast him or meaningfully constrain a less scrupulous attorney general.
Perhaps most importantly, what does the attorney general think—in broad terms, without commenting on any specific investigation—about when it is proper for the department to revisit a criminal investigation formally closed by a prior administration? This is a matter about which prior attorneys general have spoken. It is of acute concern right now with respect to the findings of the Mueller investigation, in particular Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s findings concerning potential obstruction of justice by Trump. Barr personally determined not to prosecute on the grounds that the evidence collected by Mueller was “not sufficient to establish that the President committed an obstruction-of-justice offense”—a decision widely criticized at the time as politically motivated. On entering office, Garland quickly faced calls to take a fresh look at the Justice Department’s charging decision.

So far, there have been no outward indications that the department is reconsidering Barr’s choice. That doesn’t mean that nothing is happening—Mueller left the Justice Department with a rich evidentiary record to pore over without necessarily needing to conduct further investigation. But there is a new urgency to this issue, because the window is beginning to close on the Justice Department’s ability to bring charges against Trump over obstruction

The statute of limitations for the various obstruction of justice statutes at issue is five years. Trump’s potential obstructive acts, as documented in the Mueller report, spanned from February 2017 through January 2019—so starting in February 2022, the statute of limitations will begin to kick in.

The below chart sets out the various instances of potential obstruction of justice identified by Mueller along with the expiration date for the statute of limitations. It’s an updated version of the obstruction heat map published by Lawfare after the Mueller report’s release, identifying how Mueller evaluates the strength of the three components of the obstruction statutes—an obstructive act, a nexus between the act and an official proceeding, and corrupt intent. This updated edition includes new information about Trump’s actions toward his confidante Roger Stone, which were redacted in the original copy of the Mueller report shared with the public and only revealed in July 2020. It also incorporates Trump’s pardons of Michael Flynn, Paul Manafort and Roger Stone—all of which he granted in 2020, and which arguably constitute potential obstructive acts that reset the clock on the statute of limitations.


As the chart shows, 2022 and 2023 will be crucial years for the Justice Department’s decision-making. The department will face its first deadline in February, concerning whether or not to charge Trump for his infamous conversation with then-FBI Director Comey over the bureau’s investigation into Trump’s former National Security Adviser Michael Flynn. But as the heat map shows, the strongest potential obstruction charges against Trump—as Mueller identifies them—will start to expire in June and July 2022, five years after Trump sought to engineer Mueller’s firing and then to hamstring his investigation. The chart highlights in red the expiration dates for the statute of limitations on these particularly strong cases, on the grounds that they potentially represent the hardest decisions for the Justice Department to make.

As far as we can tell, Garland has not spoken in public on the subject, leaving commentators to guess and prognosticate about the approach that the Justice Department might be taking. While it would obviously be improper for the department, or the attorney general, to speak to specific charges or defendants, it does not seem unreasonable to expect the attorney general to give some window into his thinking about the fundamental questions: Is the department deferring to Barr’s resolution of the matter? Has it, in fact, taken a look and determined that charges would be inappropriate? Or are questions arising from the Mueller report matters of active consideration?

These questions cut to the heart of public confidence in the Justice Department. A significant number of Americans are waiting for the department to hold Trump legally responsible for the many abuses for which he dodged accountability before. If the department doesn’t take such action, even if for very good reasons, these people will be disappointed and frustrated. Justice Department officials might brush off such reactions, except that this disappointment will inevitably undercut Garland’s efforts to “retain the trust of the American people.”

One of the lessons of Trump’s attacks on the integrity of the Justice Department is that most Americans don’t have a strong understanding of why independence in law enforcement matters or of the norms that, since Levi, have guided the department. Perhaps Garland’s view is that the risks of criminally investigating a former president, even in this time, are too great to take, too much of a breach of the department’s traditions. But he cannot expect people to understand that, or have a reasoned discussion of it, without first explaining it to them. And in the absence of an explanation, members of the public will come up with their own ideas—like weakness or lack of commitment to accountability. That silence undercuts the project to which Garland has committed himself.

If the goal of the Justice Department under Garland, as it was under Levi, is to rebuild the expectation that the department will act apolitically on investigative and prosecutorial matters, public communications matter. Public communications from the attorney general himself matter a lot. Garland is a scholarly man, a deeply thoughtful person. He is leaving one of his most important tools in the shed: As Levi said in one speech, “The basic tool for the lawyer is the word.”

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Friday, July 23, 2021

RSN: FOCUS: Bob Bauer | Angry Political Man

 

 

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22 July 21

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Former President Trump and Attorney General Barr at the 38th Annual National Peace Officers' Memorial Service, 2019. (photo: US Marshals Office of Public Affairs)
FOCUS: Bob Bauer | Angry Political Man
Bob Bauer, Lawfare
Bauer writes: "A book sharply critical of Bill Barr's performance as attorney general in the Trump administration presents a challenge for readers who agree with its core argument: that Barr aggressively undermined the norms that shape expectations of an attorney general and inflicted serious damage on the Department of Justice."
 VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV

A review of Elie Honig, “Hatchet Man: How Bill Barr Broke the Prosecutor's Code and Corrupted the Justice Department” (Harper, July 2021)


 book sharply critical of Bill Barr’s performance as attorney general in the Trump administration presents a challenge for readers who agree with its core argument: that Barr aggressively undermined the norms that shape expectations of an attorney general and inflicted serious damage on the Department of Justice. On the one hand, it remains important to have a clear and complete record of Barr’s deeply troubling tenure, to round it out as more facts become available, and to keep it in view throughout any project of Justice Department reform. At the same time, the success of this project depends on getting beyond moral outrage to understand how Barr’s attorney-generalship went so badly off the rails. A reader who is actively sympathetic to the strong case against Barr will also want illumination on this central question: Why did a once well-established and generally respected lawyer, whose service as attorney general during the administration of George H.W. Bush was not especially controversial, wind up delivering a disastrous encore some 25 years later?

In “Hatchet Man,” Elie Honig, a former federal and state prosecutor, offers blunt judgments—“First, Bill Barr is a liar. I won’t mince words.”—and an energetically constructed case against Barr. He provides a useful and detailed review of the low points and controversies of the Barr years.

But for all the ardor and extensiveness of his critique, Honig cannot come up with a fresh or interesting answer to this basic question. To Honig, Barr was purely and simply a bad attorney general, if not a bad person altogether: a liar and schemer and opportunist, nothing more than indicated by the title of the book. In other words, Barr was the ultimate hatchet man. But to the extent that Honig tries out an explanation, it falls flat, or alternatively fades into the background of his general contempt for Barr.

As noted previously by Quinta Jurecic in her Washington Post review of the book, Honig seems to think that Barr’s most egregious failures are grounded in his lack of prosecutorial experience. But as Jurecic points out, it’s hard to make this case when some of the more storied attorneys general, like Edward Levi, also lacked any such experience. She also notes the incongruity of this argument at a time when prosecutorial ethics have become part of the searing debate about criminal justice reform. And, at any rate, someone without prosecutorial experience is not by definition or even reasonable expectation any more likely to turn out to be a stone-cold liar and opportunist.

A further striking example of the missing explanatory framework is the failed connection between the title of Honig’s book and its main argument. A “hatchet man” carries out instructions from another: He or she is “a person whose job it is to execute unpleasant tasks for a superior, as dismissing employees.” Yet by Honig’s own account, while Barr undeniably acted on President Trump’s behalf in various respects, he was very much his own man, pursuing his own program. Trump merely provided him with his opportunity: “[F]or Barr, Trump is a vessel, a means to an end: to make his own personal vision of government, and the wider social order, a reality.”

Honig rightly points to Barr’s concern to defend an expansive vision of presidential authority and to protect the place of religion in public life from what he viewed as grave threats from a well-entrenched, secularist, progressive establishment. Barr made no bones about this agenda, as evidenced by his speech at Notre Dame in October 2019. But whatever one thinks of this world view, and there is more to say about it, Barr’s commitment to use government service to articulate and advance his own normative commitments does not support the description of him as a “hatchet man.”

It is not uncommon for passion to drive overstatement and lead to confused analysis. But at various points, Honig makes mistakes in overdrive when the record, simply presented, would have been sufficient to make his point.

For example, Honig castigates Barr for using the word “collusion” in the press conference at which he spun the results of the still-unreleased Mueller report. There is no such legal offense or concept as “collusion,” Honig correctly writes, noting that the term was a “rallying cry of Trump and his supporters,” a “refrain” that, especially in the period between the press conference and the full release, “Trump started and Barr dutifully mimicked.”

But Honig is wrong to suggest that this term was primarily a tool of Trump-world misdirection. In fact, as Victoria Clark traced on Lawfare, the term “collusion” arose first in criticisms of Trump’s and the Trump campaign’s brazen engagement with the Russian government during the 2016 campaign. And it was carried forward with gusto by the press. Thoughtful critics of the Trump campaign’s interest in Russia’s support frequently used “collusion” as a shorthand to describe Trump’s and his campaign’s conduct. So while there is the case to be made against Barr’s choice to refer to the term (see below), it cannot rest on the suggestion that the Trump campaign was exclusively responsible for its pervasive use in the public debate, or that it is somehow more questionable to use the word “collusion” when denying rather than prosecuting the charge.

Honig’s book is better seen as an impassioned manifesto than a historical account and, on that score, it succeeds. But the question remains: What happened to Bill Barr, such that sensible people who lauded his appointment were left astounded by how it all turned out?

Barr always presented as a dedicated conservative Republican, if sometimes a partisan one. And on at least one occasion during his first term as attorney general—the “House Bank” scandal of 1992—Barr left himself and the Justice Department vulnerable to charges of partisan politics and, at a minimum, of insensitivity to the appearance of playing politics. The House of Representatives operated a bank in which many members held accounts on which they overdrew, in some cases in substantial amounts. This became yet another chapter in the story the Republicans wrote, and that Newt Gingrich used to ride to the speakership, about the corrupt Democratic-controlled Congress that had illicitly maintained its grip on power for decades. While the “overdrafts” did not involve the misuse of public money, and the bank itself bore responsibility for mismanaging the accounts, the question of how the House ran the bank was a legitimate point of inquiry and criticism. But Barr responded by instituting a bizarre, suspiciously designed investigative procedure in which he appointed as a special counsel a former federal judge for whom he had clerked, Malcolm Wilkey, who then proceeded to vacuum up by subpoena the personal bank records of hundreds of members of Congress.

This process reflected a starkly deficient sensitivity to separation of powers issues, pungently captured by Wilkey’s declaration that members of Congress were no different from the depositors of a “failed S&L or a fraudulently operated [Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the subject of a major international banking scandal].” It also lent itself to the appearance that the Justice Department was helping to feed the Republican “corruption” attack on Democrats with an irresponsibly structured investigation laden with political significance. A small handful of prosecutions connected to the inquiry eventually ensued, but the vast majority of members were swept up in the investigation without any basis in evidence of wrongdoing. While they were ultimately cleared, the political damage to the House Democratic majority was extensive and may have figured to some degree in Republican success in regaining control of the House four years later.

But the House Bank was a singular, if disturbing, episode in Barr’s Bush administration service, and it is hard to see that partisanship can convincingly explain Barr’s damaging run as Trump’s attorney general. More plausible were the effects of his normative, less narrowly partisan party commitments: his robust defense of presidential power and his disgust with what he perceived to be the ascendancy of secularist progressivism. It seems that as the times changed and the politics of the country became more polarized, and as the right became more assertive and resentful, Barr went far down that same path. His views became sharper, more uncompromising, and—in this sense—more “political.”

Barr saw Republicans in the 21st century up against foes even more relentless than the liberals of the 1990s in their attacks on conservative values and morals. In his Notre Dame speech, he recalled that in the past Democrats and Republicans, with Chuck Schumer as a co-sponsor, could collaborate in passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Now the “the process of secularization has accelerated,” and “secularists, and their allies among the ‘progressives,’ have marshalled all the force of mass communications, popular culture, the entertainment industry, and academia in an unremitting assault on religion and traditional values.” Their intention, Barr declared, is to “drown out and silence opposing voices, and to attack viciously and hold up to ridicule any dissenters. … Those who defy the creed risk a figurative burning at the stake—social, educational, and professional ostracism and exclusion waged through lawsuits and savage social media campaigns.”

By the time he delivered this address, Barr revealed himself to be an angry man, not a hatchet man, and if he occasionally wielded the hatchet for Trump, he did it on his own terms and for his own purposes. In 2001, when he sat for an oral history with the University of Virginia’s Miller Center, he thought of Congress as merely annoying, likening its members to “infants,” and believed that, while the press was biased against Republicans, it had on balance been fair to him, if not to the president he served. But by the time he took over as Trump’s attorney general, Barr was seemingly convinced that Democrats and their progressive allies were playing dirty like never before and that the stakes were dramatically higher.

Thus, in the Russia investigation, and in his controversial actions in the prosecutions of former national security adviser Michael Flynn and Trump confidant Roger Stone, Barr was apparently moved by the belief that Trump’s critics were conducting a war driven by opposing ideological and political objectives rather than a legitimate horror at this president’s unprecedented and open contempt for legal limits and norms. He said as much in his press remarks on the Mueller Report—that on taking office, “President Trump faced an unprecedented situation” of investigations and press suspicion—and in a November 2019 speech to the Federalist Society that denounced Trump opponents’ “explicit strategy of using every tool and maneuver available to sabotage the functioning of [his] Administration.”

Barr seems to have believed that in a war like this he should not have to observe norms that only rewarded the opposition’s bad faith and constrained an effective defense of the president. On the available record, this seems a reasonable, if not the most convincing, reading of the difference between the Barr of the 1990s and the one who ran Trump’s Justice Department 30 years later. And this passage tracked the course of polarized politics from his first to his second term as attorney general. Survey research showed that over the period from the end of George H.W. Bush’s administration to the election of Donald Trump, substantial numbers of Democrats and Republicans came not merely to disagree with, but to detest, each other. They reported that the other party made them “afraid,” and each party assigned to the other attributes of “immorality” and “dishonesty.”

It is the attorney general’s job not to be an active combatant in these polarized, partisan struggles but to do what can possibly be done to insulate the Justice Department from them. The more intense the pressure on norms coming from outside the department, the higher the responsibility to protect those norms from within. Barr failed not because he did not honor the code of the prosecutor, as Honig argues, but because he chose through his actions and public commentary to dishonor the norms that an attorney general should be concerned above all to preserve. It was in this sense that he was too political.

So when Barr chose to speak on pending cases or in other ways inappropriate for the attorney general, it appeared that he felt compelled to enter the wider political controversies swirling around Trump. How else to explain that, in the wake of the Justice Department inspector general’s finding that the Russia investigation was adequately predicated, Barr responded with a public statement of his contrary opinion that the inquiry had been initiated only on the “thinnest of suspicions” and that, “from its inception, the evidence produced by the investigation was consistently exculpatory”? Or that, while conceding that he had no evidence of illegal Obama administration surveillance of the Trump campaign, he declared nonetheless that “I think spying did occur”? In these cases, as in his press conference on the Mueller report, Barr exhibited the urge and apparent mission to score points off partisan adversaries: the Democrats and progressives who, as he stated in his 2019 speech to the Federalist Society, were “using every tool and maneuver available to sabotage the functioning of [Trump’s] Administration.” This is likely why Barr could not resist describing the Mueller report as not finding any “collusion”—and also the reason he should not have made such a statement.

Many of Barr’s critics, Honig included, believe that he simply assumed the role of Trump’s defense counsel. That Barr provided ample room for this perception seems undeniable, and it is yet one more point against him that he invited this judgment. But it seems less likely that he saw things quite this way. As his Notre Dame speech illustrated, the political and culture war that he was all too eager to fight was far broader, more consequential, than whatever served Trump’s immediate political purposes.

Some of the more restrained Barr of the 1990s did show up from time to time during his Trump years. He registered a public objection to Trump’s tweets assailing the Justice Department, complaining that they complicated his job. To be sure, he could have done more, taken an even stronger stand in defending crucial norms. Resignation would have been the more compelling choice when it became clear that Trump would pay no attention to Barr’s concerns on this score. And while those defending Barr in the Russia matter will fairly note that he did not seek to block the release of the Mueller report nor object to Mueller’s testimony to Congress, it’s not clear that this course of action was, as a practical matter, open to him.

Most importantly, Barr eventually separated himself from Trump’s attempts to subvert the 2020 election. Unfortunately, this last stand, while exceptionally important to the preservation of democracy, came only after Barr threw some “vote fraud“ rhetoric the president’s way, in the course of which he gave an entirely false account of fraud in Texas that the department had to quickly walk back, blaming flawed briefing materials. Barr also unnecessarily opined on the risks of fraud in mail voting, a subject about which he was clearly ignorant and a major point of political conflict on which he should have stayed silent.

Still, against the backdrop of Jan. 6 and the epic struggle over voting rights that has followed, we might well appreciate this much: As dismal as Barr’s performance was in critical respects, there were other Republican leaders who would have gladly done and said what Barr eventually refused to do and say to help Trump deny and resist his loss.

The point here is not that this final act of responsibility cleanses Barr of responsibility for a damaging stewardship of the Justice Department. It is simply a part of the history of his journey from a vaunted member of the legal elites to a much criticized, and in some quarters actively despised, attorney general all too symptomatic of the ugly, polarized politics of the time. The story of Bill Barr underscores the urgent need for the Justice Department to resist these pressures, and for legislative and internal reforms to ensure that it does. Barr decided to pick and choose his moments of norm-breaking, drawing the line at helping a president with planning for subversion of a presidential election, but a future attorney general, in an even more drastically politicized Justice Department, could well choose differently.

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